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Abstract
Deep learning models often raise privacy con-
cerns as they leak information about their train-
ing data. This enables an adversary to determine
whether a data point was in a model’s train-
ing set by conducting a membership inference
attack (MIA). Prior work has conjectured that
regularization techniques, which combat overfit-
ting, may also mitigate the leakage. While many
regularization mechanisms exist, their effective-
ness against MIAs has not been studied system-
atically, and the resulting privacy properties are
not well understood. We explore the lower bound
for information leakage that practical attacks can
achieve. First, we evaluate the effectiveness of 8
mechanisms in mitigating two recent MIAs, on
three standard image classification tasks. We find
that certain mechanisms, such as label smooth-
ing, may inadvertently help MIAs. Second, we
investigate the potential of improving the re-
silience to MIAs by combining complementary
mechanisms. Finally, we quantify the oppor-
tunity of future MIAs to compromise privacy
by designing a white-box distance-to-confident
(DtC) metric, based on adversarial sample craft-
ing. Our metric reveals that, even when exist-
ing MIAs fail, the training samples may remain
distinguishable from test samples. This suggests
that regularization mechanisms can provide a
false sense of privacy, even when they appear ef-
fective against existing MIAs.
1 Introduction
Deep learning has emerged as one of the cornerstones of
large-scale machine learning. However, its fundamental de-
pendence on data forces practitioners to collect and use per-
sonal information (Shokri & Shmatikov, 2015). This sit-
uation has given rise to privacy concerns as deep learn-
ing models are shown to leak information about their data
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through their behaviors or structures (Fredrikson et al.,
2015; Yang et al., 2019; Carlini et al., 2018; Shokri et al.,
2017). In particular, membership inference attacks (MIAs)
enable an adversary to find out whether a data point was in
a model’s training set. This often represents a serious pri-
vacy threat; for example, learning that an individual is in a
hospital’s diagnosis training data via an MIA also reveals
that this individual was a patient there.
MIAs are possible when the adversary can distinguish be-
tween a model’s predictions on training set and test set sam-
ples. In this case, information that leaks from the model
allows the adversary to infer which samples were used for
training the model. Differential privacy (DP) provides a for-
mal upper bound for this information leakage (Abadi et al.,
2016). While this guarantees that the model is not vulner-
able to MIAs, prior work suggests that DP is hard to ap-
ply without hurting the model’s utility (Abadi et al., 2016;
Rahman et al., 2018), and its guarantees might be too re-
strictively conservative against known attacks (Jayaraman
& Evans, 2019). As utility is a key factor for the adoption
of security mechanisms in practice, researchers have also
made a connection between the vulnerability to MIAs and
overfitting, which increases the model’s prediction confi-
dence for the samples in the training set. In consequence,
prior work has conjectured that regularization may repre-
sent a practical defense against MIAs, as it discourages
models from overfitting to their training data (Yeom et al.,
2017; Shokri et al., 2017; Salem et al., 2018).
The prior work leaves several open questions. While many
regularization mechanisms have been proposed over the
past few years (Gastaldi, 2017; Wan et al., 2013; Kaya
et al., 2019; Hinton et al., 2015), it is unclear whether
all mechanisms are effective, or which are more effective
against MIAs. Furthermore, it is unknown whether they
prevent the same leakage, or their effects can complement
each other for better resilience to MIAs. More importantly,
the effectiveness of regularization mechanisms against ex-
isting MIAs may not reflect the vulnerability of models to
future attacks.
In this paper, we systematically analyze the effectiveness
of regularization mechanisms against MIAs. Unlike the
theoretical upper bound for leakage provided by differ-
ential privacy, we explore the lower bound that practical
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attacks can achieve. We first evaluate 8 popular regular-
ization mechanisms against two state-of-the-art MIAs us-
ing modern convolutional neural networks, on three popu-
lar image classification tasks: Fashion-MNIST, CIFAR-10,
and CIFAR-100. We find that (i) some mechanisms, such as
distillation and random data augmentation, are more effec-
tive than others in mitigating MIAs, including DP; (ii) ap-
plying regularization for only increasing a model’s utility
leads to less-than-ideal protection against MIAs; and (iii)
some mechanisms, especially label smoothing (Szegedy
et al., 2016), might significantly exacerbate the vulnera-
bility over a standard model. Building on our findings, we
propose guidelines on selecting and applying regularization
against MIAs for practitioners. We also see that increasing
the intensity of a single mechanism, e.g., distillation, might
bring diminishing returns for privacy. This leads us to ask
whether it is beneficial to combine multiple mechanisms.
Our evaluation considers each mechanism independently;
however, it might be possible to apply them in conjunction.
Prior work suggests that different regularization mech-
anisms alter the model in distinct ways. For example,
dropout is thought to approximate a large ensemble of net-
works (Baldi & Sadowski, 2013); whereas label smoothing
changes the geometry of the activations and forces well-
separated clusters (Müller et al., 2019). Given these diverse
effects, we also investigate the benefits of combining mul-
tiple regularization mechanisms against MIAs. We observe
that combining an effective mechanism with a less effective
one might improve upon only applying the effective mech-
anism by itself. To mitigate MIAs, we believe that finding
optimal combinations is an important research challenge.
The success against known MIAs provides a lower bound
for the privacy leakage vulnerability. Against a potentially
stronger attack, however, this may give a false sense of pri-
vacy. In the absence of formal guarantees, we aim to pro-
vide more realistic lower bounds by designing a white-box
metric, distance-to-confident (DtC), based on an adversar-
ial example crafting algorithm (Madry et al., 2017). Specif-
ically, we slowly perturb a data sample until the model clas-
sifies it with high confidence, and our metric quantifies the
amount of perturbation required. Intuitively, if a model has
no leakage, the DtC scores on its training and test sam-
ples would be similar. However, even in cases when ex-
isting MIAs fail completely, the DtC gap between train-
ing and test samples still persists. This discrepancy may be
exploited by an unknown future attack to tell the training
samples apart. When we apply our metric to differentially-
private models, the DtC gap disappears as the guarantees
get stronger. This shows that stronger DP guarantees are
actually useful against MIAs and not as overly conserva-
tive as previously thought.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
•We systematically evaluate 8 popular regularization
mechanisms against existing membership inference attacks
(MIAs). We identify the pitfalls and the best practices of
using regularization to defeat MIAs (Section 4).
•We investigate the benefits of combining multiple mecha-
nisms against MIAs and find the combinations that provide
additional resilience with less utility damage (Section 5).
•We design the distance-to-confident (DtC) metric based
on adversarial perturbations and reveal that mechanisms
that eliminate MIAs might still result in discrepancies be-
tween the training and the test sets. This hints that resilience
against existing MIAs might give a false sense of privacy
(Section 6).
2 Related Work
Membership Inference Attacks on Deep Learning.
Membership inference attacks (MIAs) have been proposed
as an indicator of fundamental privacy flaws in deep learn-
ing. Shokri et al. (2017) propose an MIA based on training
an inference model to distinguish between a model’s pre-
dictions on training and test set samples. Yeom et al. (2017)
propose a simpler, but equally effective, attack that com-
pares the model’s prediction loss (or confidence) on a target
sample with the model’s average loss on its training set. Fi-
nally, building on Shokri et al.’s work, Salem et al. (2018)
have developed more effective attacks that require weaker
assumptions. These studies have suggested simple regular-
ization techniques as a countermeasure against MIAs. The
lack of comprehensive evaluation on the effectiveness of
regularization, however, prevents it from being considered
as a defense, in practice. We use these attacks to evaluate
a wide range of regularization techniques on modern tasks
and investigate whether regularization is actually effective.
Deep Learning with Differential Privacy. Differential
privacy (DP) offers a formal method to measure and limit
an algorithm’s privacy leakage (Dwork, 2008). Building
on this framework, Abadi et al. (2016) have proposed
a deep learning training algorithm, differentially private
stochastic gradient descent (DP-SGD). DP-SGD, by clip-
ping and adding noise to the parameter updates, ensures
that a model’s leakage stays within a privacy budget, ε.
However, as DP focuses on the worst-case leakage, Jayara-
man & Evans (2019) have shown that its guarantees might
be too strict against realistic attacks. In the same context,
Rahman et al. (2018) suggest that DP-SGD mitigates exist-
ing MIAs at the cost of the model’s utility. We use DP as a
baseline to compare against as its resilience against MIAs
is backed by formal guarantees.
Generalization and Memorization in Deep Learning.
Recent work has attempted to explain why deep learning
models generalize well to unseen samples, despite their
tendency to memorize. Arpit et al. (2017) and Zhang et al.
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(2016) have shown that a model can memorize random data
and labels with almost perfect accuracy, which indicates
their capacity to overfit to their training data. These stud-
ies have also shown that regularization techniques, such as
dropout (Srivastava et al., 2014) or weight decay (Krogh &
Hertz, 1992), might hinder memorization. Further, several
studies have proposed deep learning regularization tech-
niques for improving generalization, such as label smooth-
ing (Szegedy et al., 2016), small batch size (Keskar et al.,
2016), and shake-shake (Gastaldi, 2017). We investigate
the ties between regularization, generalization, and vulner-
ability of deep learning models to MIAs.
3 Experimental Setup
Datasets. We use three datasets for benchmarking:
Fashion-MNIST (Xiao et al., 2017), CIFAR-10 and
CIFAR-100 (Krizhevsky et al., 2009). The Fashion-MNIST
consists of 28x28 pixels, gray-scale images of fashion
items drawn from 10 classes; containing 60,000 training
and 10,000 validation images. The CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-
100 consist of 32x32 pixels, colored natural images drawn
from 10 and 100 classes, respectively; containing 50,000
training and 10,000 validation images. We train our base-
line models without any data augmentation; however, we
study random cropping as a regularization mechanism.
These tasks represent different levels of learning complex-
ity and risk of overfitting; Fashion-MNIST being the easi-
est task and CIFAR-100 being the most difficult as it has a
large number of classes and few samples per class.
Architectures and Hyperparameters. We experiment
with variants of a popular convolutional neural network
(CNN) architecture, VGG (Simonyan & Zisserman, 2014).
VGG is a prototypical architecture, on which complex ar-
chitectures are built. For Fashion-MNIST, CIFAR-10, and
CIFAR-100, we use 4-layer, 7-layer, and 9-layer CNNs, re-
spectively. We train our models for 30 epochs, with 0.0002
learning rate, using the ADAM optimizer from (Reddi
et al., 2019). By default, we set the L2 weight decay co-
efficient to 10−6 and the batch size to 128. We run our ex-
periments several times to compensate for the randomness
in training deep learning models.
Metrics. To quantify a model’s utility, we use its top-1
accuracy on the validation set, Acc, as a percentage. An
MIA’s accuracy, Inf , is the probability that the adversary
can guess correctly whether an input is from the training
set or not. We apply the MIAs on a set of data points,
sampled from the training and testing sets of the model
with an equal probability. Note that, on this data set, a
random guessing strategy will lead to 50% inference ac-
curacy. To quantify the success of an MIA, we use the
adversary advantage metric (Yeom et al., 2017) as a per-
centage, i.e., Adv = 2 × (Inf − 50%). Finally, to quan-
tify a mechanism’s impact on utility, we measure the rel-
ative accuracy drop (RAD) over a baseline model, i.e.,
(Accbaseline−Accmechanism)/Accbaseline.
4 Effectiveness of Regularization
Setting. We consider the supervised learning setting and
the standard feed-forward deep neural network (DNN)
structure for classification. A DNN model, a classifier, is a
function, F , that maps an input sample x, e.g., a natural im-
age, to an output vector yˆ, e.g., the probabilities of image x
belonging to each class label. The model then classifies x in
the most likely class, i.e., yˆi = argmaxi yˆ. The parameters
of a DNN are learned on a private training set, S, contain-
ing multiple (x, y) pairs; where y is the ground-truth label
of x. During training, the model’s parameters are updated
to minimize its loss L(yˆ, y), i.e., a measure of how off yˆ
is from y, on the samples in S. After training, the model
is tested on previously unseen data samples, D. Because
of their immense learning capacity, modern DNNs usually
overfit to their training set and have a large generalization
gap, i.e., their performance on S diverges from their per-
formance onD. As a result of overfitting, F produces more
accurate and more confident predictions on S than on D.
Attacks. Membership inference attacks (MIAs) aim to find
out whether a particular sample, (xt, yt), was in S of the
victim model, Fv . They exploit the generalization gap and
the discrepancies between Fv’s predictions on S and D.
As we are investigating ways to mitigate this vulnerability,
we consider a strong adversary that has (i) query access
to Fv , i.e., Fv(x)∀x; (ii) the average loss, L, of Fv on the
samples in S; and (iii) some input samples from bothD and
S of the Fv . In our experiments, we use two state-of-the-art
MIAs from Yeom et al. (2017) and Salem et al. (2018). In
Yeom et al.’s attack, the adversary obtains Fv(xt) = yˆt and
computes Lt = L(yˆt, yt). The adversary then infers that xt
is in S if Lt < L. In Salem et al.’s attack, the adversary
collects Fv(xi)∀xi ∈ A, where A is a set of samples from
D and S. Then the adversary, using A as its training set,
learns a binary classifier to classify Fv(xt) as either being
in S or not.
Regularization Mechanisms. Regularization is any mod-
ification to a learning algorithm that aims to reduce its
generalization gap and to mitigate overfitting. We eval-
uate 8 common mechanisms that alter different parts of
deep learning pipeline: (i) training label transformations;
(ii) training data perturbations; (iii) architectural modifi-
cations; and (iv) optimization methods. In (i), we evalu-
ate distillation with temperature (Hinton et al., 2015) and
label smoothing (Szegedy et al., 2016). In (ii), we evalu-
ate adding Gaussian noise to training samples (Arpit et al.,
2017) and data augmentation via padding then randomly
cropping (Simonyan & Zisserman, 2014). In (iii), we evalu-
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ate dropout after convolutional layers (Szegedy et al., 2016)
and spatial dropout (Tompson et al., 2015). In (iv), we eval-
uate weight decay (Krogh & Hertz, 1992) and early stop-
ping at an epoch (Caruana et al., 2001). Against mecha-
nisms that manipulate the labels or the data, we assume that
the adversary only knows the original distribution. We give
hyperparameter ranges for each mechanism in Table 1.
Table 1: The regularization mechanisms and their associ-
ated hyperparameters.
MECHANISM HYPERPARAMETER RANGE
DISTILLATION (T ) 1 ≤ T ≤ 100
LABEL SMOOTHING (α) 1 ≤ α ≤ 0.99
GAUSSIAN NOISE (σ) 0.01 ≤ σ ≤ 0.25
RANDOM CROPPING (c) 1 ≤ c ≤ 24
DROPOUT (p) 0.05 ≤ p ≤ 0.95
SPAT. DROPOUT (q) 0.05 ≤ q ≤ 0.95
WEIGHT DECAY (λ) 1e− 6 ≤ λ ≤ 0.5
EARLY STOPPING (E) 30 ≥ E ≥ 1
4.1 Finding the Most Effective Mechanisms
To use as our baselines, we present our CNNs with no reg-
ularization in Table 2. For each task’s baseline model, the
table includes its accuracy, Acc, and its adversary advan-
tage rates against MIAs, AdvY eom, and AdvSalem. Note
that MIAs are less threatening on the simpler task, Fashion-
MNIST, as the model already achieves high accuracy on
unseen samples. This highlights that the risk of MIAs is
even greater for modern, large-scale tasks and further mo-
tivates our study. Moreover, we also see that Yeom et al.’s
MIA usually leads to a higher adversary advantage than
Salem et al.’s. Thus, in our experiments, we use Yeom et
al.’s MIA to identify the most effective configurations.
Table 2: The baseline models with no regularization. We
present their validation accuracies and the membership in-
ference advantage rates against them.
TASK Acc AdvY eom AdvSalem
FASHION-MNIST 92.6% 9.6% 8.3%
CIFAR-10 81.9% 35.8% 18.5%
CIFAR-100 57.3% 68.9% 49.9%
As the mechanisms we apply might hurt a model’s accu-
racy, we evaluate our results under three different utility
scenarios: maximum utility (Max), <5% and <15% rela-
tive accuracy drop (RAD) over the corresponding baseline
model. Our scenarios focus on having reasonable utility for
practitioners, based on the standards prior work sets (Hong
et al., 2019). In the Max scenario, to give an idea about
how MIAs fare when we apply regularization only for in-
creasing utility, we find the setting of each mechanism that
results in the highest accuracy. In the RAD scenarios, we
find the settings that yield models with the smallest adver-
sary advantage, within the respective RAD limit.
We present the results on Fashion-MNIST, CIFAR-10, and
CIFAR-100 in Tables 3, 4 and 5, respectively. We first
see that increasing regularization intensity usually leads to
more accuracy drop and, also, decreases the MIA success,
by hindering the model’s ability to overfit. Further, mitigat-
ing MIAs is significantly easier on Fashion-MNIST than on
more complex tasks. On Fashion MNIST, within 5% RAD,
regularization reduces AdvY eom, on average, by 82% and
up to 95%. On CIFAR-10, after regularization AdvY eom
drops, on average, by 44%, and up to 93%; and on CIFAR-
100, it drops by 35% and up to 80%. Within 15% RAD, on
Fashion-MNIST, regularization reduces AdvY eom, on av-
erage, by 91% and up to 100%; on CIFAR-10, by 70% and,
up to, 94%; and on CIFAR-100, by 41% and, up to, 87%.
Our results show that eliminating MIAs on complex tasks
is challenging even after incurring significant utility losses.
Note that applying regularization for maximum accuracy
does not lead to a significant reduction in MIA success,
except for random cropping and distillation mechanisms.
In the Max scenario, regularization reduces AdvY eom, on
average, by only 40%, 22%, and 14%; on Fashion-MNIST,
CIFAR-10, and CIFAR-100, respectively. Further, decreas-
ing the generalization gap and increasing Acc via regular-
ization usually reduces MIA success; however, in certain
cases, such as label smoothing, it can have the opposite ef-
fect. This suggests that the connection between the gener-
alization gap and the vulnerability to MIAs might not be as
clear as previously thought (Yeom et al., 2017).
Mechanism Consistency. As we aim is to provide guide-
lines for practitioners, we evaluate regularization mecha-
nisms in terms of their consistency across the board. We
first see that distillation and random cropping are the most
effective and consistent mechanisms. Within 5% RAD, ran-
dom cropping reduces AdvY eom and AdvSalem by 87%;
and distillation reduces AdvY eom by 81% and AdvSalem
by 100%. However, considering the small drop in MIA suc-
cess between 5% RAD and 15% RAD scenarios; we ob-
serve diminishing returns, especially for distillation.
Prior work suggests dropout and weight decay against
MIAs (Salem et al., 2018; Shokri et al., 2017). How-
ever, we find that dropout reduces AdvY eom only by 40%
and AdvSalem by 42% and weight decay may increase
AdvSalem by, up to, 35%. Further, we also evaluate spa-
tial dropout (Tompson et al., 2015), as dropout is known to
be ineffective for modern CNNs (Wu & Gu, 2015). Spa-
tial dropout is more consistent against MIAs than dropout:
reducing AdvY eom by 68% and AdvSalem by 63%.
Label smoothing is a recent technique that has seen
widespread use (Müller et al., 2019). We find that it reduces
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Table 3: Applying regularization mechanisms on Fashion-
MNIST, in three utility scenarios. Each cell contains the
mechanism’s hyperparameter and the relative changes over
the baseline model in Acc, AdvY eom, and AdvSalem; in its
top left, top right, bottom left, and bottom right quadrants,
respectively. In terms of Adv, ‘*’ marks the highest drop
and ‘†’ marks an inadvertent increase.
MAX RAD < 5% RAD < 15%
T=2 +0.1%
-33.3% -9.6%
T=50 -2.9%
-94.8%* -100%*
T=50 -2.9%
-94.8% -100%*
α=.01 +0.2%
-8.3% +34.9%†
α=.9 -1.5%
-63.5% -100%*
α=.99 -10.8%
-95.8% -100%*
σ=.025 -0.9%
-66.7% -73.5%
σ=.2 -4.1%
-81.3% -100%*
σ=.225 -6.7%
-84.4% -100%*
c=1 -0.1%
-81.3%* -81.9%*
c=4 -3.0%
-90.7% -100%*
c=18 -9.9%
-100%* -100%*
p=.5 +0.2%
-55.2% -73.5%
p=.95 -2.5%
-85.4% -100%*
p=.95 -2.5%
-85.4% -100%*
q=.25 +0.2%
-52.1% -100%
q=.75 -2.6%
-87.5% -100%*
q=.95 -11.0%
-89.6% -100%*
λ=1e−4 +0.1%
-1.0% +9.6%†
λ=.01 -1.5%
-72.9% -97.6%
λ=.1 -9.1%
-93.8% -100%*
E=20 +0.1%
-28.1% -19.3%
E=1 -4.9%
-80.2% -96.4%
E=1 -4.9%
-80.2% -96.4%
AdvY eom by 43%; however, it also consistently increases
AdvSalem; most notably by, up to, 59% on CIFAR-100 in
the Max scenario. Surprisingly, when the label smoothing
reduces the generalization gap the most, it also increases
the AdvSalem the most. Müller et al. (2019) find that label
smoothing erases information and encourages the model
to treat incorrect classes as equally probable. We hypoth-
esize that models trained with label smoothing overfit on
the smooth labels and produce more smooth output proba-
bilities on S than onD. This helps Salem et al.’s attack as it
relies on output probabilities; whereas, Yeom et al.’s attack
cannot capitalize on it. We believe this adverse effect poses
a severe security risk to practitioners.
Further, we find that adding Gaussian noise is only effective
if the task is simple enough to tolerate a noisy S; however,
as the task gets more complex, the noise hurts Acc more
than it reduces Adv. Finally, even though early stopping is
not the most effective, it is a consistent way of preventing
MIAs; the earlier the training ends, the less successful both
MIAs are, in exchange for reducing the accuracy.
Comparison with Differential Privacy. To use as a base-
line, we train Fashion-MNIST models using DP-SGD by
Abadi et al. (2016). Using DP on more complex tasks with-
out hurting a model’s accuracy requires additional tech-
niques, such as transfer learning, that are not always avail-
Table 4: Applying regularization mechanisms on CIFAR-
10, in three utility scenarios.
MAX RAD < 5% RAD < 15%
T=5 +1.3%
-50.3% +13.5%†
T=25 -2.4%
-78.2% -100%*
T=50 -8.2%
-84.7% -100%*
α=.01 +1.2%
-31.0% +33.5%†
α=.01 +1.2%
-31.0% +33.5%†
α=.99 -10.1%
-46.1% -100%*
σ=.01 -1.0%
-0.1% +9.2%†
σ=.025 -4.2%
-21.5% -18.4%
σ=.05 -11.1%
-44.9% -42.2%
c=2 +3.5%
-48.6% -31.9%
c=22 -3.7%
-92.7%* -72.8%
c=24 -7.7%
-93.8%* -78.4%
p=.25 -1.9%
-8.7% +3.2%†
p=.5 -3.4%
-28.2% -16.8%
p=.95 -9.3%
-63.4% -42.2%
q=.1 +0.6%
-20.4% +23.2%†
q=.25 -0.6%
-59.5% -36.2%
q=.5 -12.9%
-92.2% -89.2%
λ=5e−4 +1.0%
-17.0% +35.7%†
λ=5e−4 +1.0%
-17.0% +35.7%†
λ = .1 -13.3%
-81.3% -92.4%
E=30 +0.0%
+0.0% +0.0%
E=20 -3.4%
-25.4% -21.1%
E=2 -13.9%
-84.1% -72.4%
able (Abadi et al., 2016; Rahman et al., 2018).
We control the intensity of DP by varying the amount
of noise added to the gradients, σDP , during training.
The noise also determines the privacy budget, ε; which
is the formal limit on much information the model leaks.
We experiment with 0.01≤σDP≤10, which results in
3×105>ε>0.15. Prior work considers budgets ε<1 for-
mally acceptable for privacy (Jayaraman & Evans, 2019).
Within 5% RAD, σDP = 0.1; ε ≈ 3× 103 reduces Acc by
4.1%, AdvY eom by 82.3% and AdvSalem by 100%; falling
behind techniques such as distillation, random cropping,
spatial dropout, and dropout. Within 15% RAD, σDP =
0.25; ε ≈ 2 × 102 reduces Acc by 5.4%, AdvY eom by
90.1% and AdvSalem by 100%; again, falling behind dis-
tillation, random cropping, and weight decay. Finally, even
applying strong DP with σDP = 10; ε ≈ 0.15 falls be-
hind regularization by reducing AdvY eom by 92.7%, while
significantly hurting the Acc by 16.7%.
Our results show that, against known MIAs, regularization
offers a more practical solution than DP. Further, we con-
firm the prior findings that thwarting MIAs might not re-
quire strong formal guarantees (Jayaraman & Evans, 2019).
However, in Section 6, we show that certain mechanisms,
such as distillation, might result in observably distinct be-
haviors for S and D; even when the MIAs fail. This in-
dicates that the success against known MIAs might give a
false sense of privacy. DP, on the other hand, because of its
worst-case guarantees, provides a true sense of privacy.
Takeaways. Our experiments reveal that distillation, spa-
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Table 5: Applying regularization mechanisms on CIFAR-
100, in three utility scenarios.
MAX RAD < 5% RAD < 15%
T=3 +3.1%
-38.3% +23.8%†
T=50 -4.2%
-68.6% -99.4%*
T=100 -6.1%
-68.8% -100%*
α=.5 +5.9%*
-32.2% +58.7%†
α=.95 +5.6%
-36.4% +23.4%†
α=.95 +5.6%
-36.4% +23.4%†
σ=.01 +0.2%
-2.9% -4.4%
σ=.01 +0.2%
-2.9% -4.4%
σ=.025 -6.5%
-16.7% -16.0%
c=2 +3.3%
-24.7% -19.8%
c=16 -4.4%
-79.8%* -87.6%
c=20 -5.9%
-86.9%* -100%*
p=.1 -0.9%
-0.2% -8.4%
p=.25 -1.4%
-7.8% -9.4%
p=.5 -5.9%
-17.1% -15.2%
q=.05 -1.9%
-10.6% -10.4%
q=.25 -2.0%
-52.9% -53.1%
q=.25 -2.0%
-52.9% -53.1%
λ=1e−5 +1.2%
+1.0%† -6.8%
λ=5e−4 -2.4%
-18.9% +26.6%†
λ=5e−4 -2.4%
-18.9% +26.6%†
E=30 +0.0%
+0.0% +0.0%
E=15 -1.1%
-7.7% -1.4%
E=10 -10.3%
-33.1% -31.9%
tial dropout, and data augmentation with random crop-
ping are consistent and effective mechanisms for defeating
MIAs against CNN models. We see that these mechanisms
almost significantly prevent known MIAs while not pre-
serving a model’s accuracy. Further, compared to DP, reg-
ularization reduces the attacker’s success more with less
utility penalty. Moreover, defeating MIAs requires strong
regularization; therefore, applying regularization to mainly
increasing accuracy provides limited privacy benefits. In
terms of ease-of-tuning, early stopping is a practical choice
as it yields predictable benefits without requiring any tun-
ing. Finally, label smoothing and, in certain cases, weight
decay might exacerbate the vulnerability against MIAs that
leverage output probabilities. As a result, we believe these
popular mechanisms might expose the practitioners to a se-
rious privacy compromise.
5 Combining Multiple Mechanisms
In the previous section, we show that using regularization
mechanisms in Table 1 can prevent MIAs. Especially for
distillation, however, we observe diminishing returns as we
increase the intensity of a single mechanism. Here, we in-
vestigate whether combining two mechanisms has any ben-
efits over individual mechanisms against MIAs.
Methodology. We evaluate the effectiveness of the mech-
anism pairs on CIFAR-100 as the most vulnerable task
to MIAs. We set the mechanism hyperparameters in ac-
cordance with the RAD<5 scenario. We use distillation
(T=50) or random cropping (c=16) in each pair as they
are individually the most effective mechanisms. We use the
results in the RAD<15 scenario to answer whether a pair,
e.g., T=50 and λ=1e−5, is more effective than a single
mechanism with higher intensity, e.g., T=100.
Table 6: Combining mechanisms on CIFAR-100. We pair
each mechanism with distillation (T ) or random cropping
(c) in the RAD<5 scenario. Rows ‘5’ and ‘15’ present the
results on individually applying T and c, in the RAD<5
and RAD<15 scenarios, respectively.
T = 50 c = 16
AdvY eom AdvSalem Acc AdvY eom AdvSalem Acc
5 -68.6% -99.4% -4.2% -79.8% -87.6% -4.4%
15 -68.8% -100% -6.1% -86.9% -100.0% -5.9%
T - - - -93.1% -100.0% -10.1%
α -68.5% -100.0% -2.5% -87.1% -100.0% -10.5%
σ -69.1% -100.0% -4.0% -82.3% -88.5% -5.3%
c -93.1% -100.0% -10.1% - - -
p -72.1% -100.0% -6.2% -85.0% -89.4% -10.3%
q -89.8% -100.0% -10.0% -96.0% -100.0% -31.4%
λ -96.5% -100.0% -48.8% -84.7% -88.1% -5.8%
E -71.0% -100.0% -4.4% -92.3% -95.3% -24.9%
Evaluating the Combinations. Table 6 summarizes the ef-
fectiveness of combining two mechanisms. For distillation,
between T=50 and T=100, we see diminishing returns in
resilience against MIAs; whereas, for cropping, between
c=16 and c=20, the improvement is more significant.
We observe that combining distillation with other mech-
anisms counters MIAs more than moving from T=50 to
T=100. For T=100, theAdvY eom andAdvSalem decrease
by 69% and 100%, respectively; however, almost all the
combinations of distillation, decrease AdvY eom more. The
combinations with label smoothing and Gaussian noise
mechanisms lead to less drop in Acc, while achieving
comparable resilience. Combining with weight decay, even
though reducing AdvY eom by 96%; causes a significant
49% accuracy drop. Combining with spatial dropout or
cropping, achieves an impressive∼90% drop in AdvY eom;
while still staying within RAD<15.
On the other hand, random cropping does not benefit
from combinations as much as distillation. For c=20, the
AdvY eom and AdvSalem decrease by 87% and 100%, re-
spectively; however, almost all combinations with crop-
ping show similar resilience with more accuracy drop.
Most notably, the combination with spatial dropout leads
to 96% reduction in AdvY eom, while causing 31% drop in
Acc. Across the board, this setting achieves the highest re-
silience while causing significantly less accuracy drop than
the combination of distillation and weight decay.
Finally, combining early stopping with random cropping
hurts the accuracy significantly; whereas, with distillation,
it results in marginal changes. The reason is that distillation
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speeds up the training (Hinton et al., 2015); while aggres-
sive random cropping slows it down by randomly removing
features. Compared to distillation, the models trained with
random cropping require more passes over the training set
to learn the important features. To validate, we first com-
bine T=50 with E={20, 15, 10, 5} and see 3%, 4%, 6%,
and 8% accuracy drops, respectively. On the other hand,
when we combine c=16 with E={20, 15, 10, 5}, it results
in 14%, 25%, 29%, and 46% utility loss, respectively. This
implies that combining two mechanisms that have similar
effects on a model might counteract with each other and
lead to a substantial accuracy drop.
6 Exposing the False Sense of Privacy
This section aims at designing a white-box metric for pro-
viding more realistic lower bounds for the vulnerability to
MIAs than existing black-box attacks. In the previous sec-
tions, we find that some regularization mechanisms signif-
icantly reduce the attack’s success while preserving the ac-
curacy. This might convince the practitioners to use these
mechanisms to safeguard the privacy of their training data.
Here, in the absence of formal guarantees, we apply our
metric to study whether this sense of privacy is well placed.
Our distance-to-confident (DtC) metric builds on the intu-
ition that the samples in S are closer to a model’s confident
decision regions the ones in D. In these regions, a model’s
predictions are highly confident and produce low losses.
When a model overfits on S, it places the majority of its
training samples in these regions; which enables the MIAs
to discern them. We expect that, for the samples outside
these regions, the distance to a confident region is less for
the samples in S than the ones inD. This discrepancy com-
promises privacy as it provides an adversary with leverage
to characterize the training samples.
The Distance-to-Confident (DtC) Metric. We specify a
sample (x, y) as not in a confident region of the model F ,
ifL(F (x), y) > L˜, where L˜ is the F ’s median loss on its S.
The basis of our metric is finding the shortest distance from
x to a confident region. Since it is not possible to directly
measure the distances in the decisions of a deep learning
model, prior work has used adversarial input perturbations
as a proxy (Tramèr et al., 2017). Similarly, we use PGD
perturbations (Madry et al., 2017) to measure the distance
from a sample (x, y) to a confident region. As PGD per-
turbations require access to a model’s all internal details,
such as its gradients, DtC is a white-box metric. However,
the practical ways of applying adversarial perturbations in
the black-box setting (Guo et al., 2019) makes using our
DtC metric towards a powerful membership inference at-
tack possible. Here, we utilize it as a defensive metric and
leave this conversion into an attack as future work.
To move x to a confident region, we start from x0 = x and,
at each step, we perturb xt as xt+1 to reduce the F ’s loss,
Lt = L(F (xt), y). These perturbations slowly move x to
a confident, low-loss, region and we stop perturbing when
Lt < L˜. The DtC of x for the model F is then given by the
distance from x to the final xt, i.e., CF (x) = ||xt − x||∞.
In our experiments, we apply PGD for 100 steps and set the
step size, ||xt+1 − xt||∞, as 0.001. This results in 0.001 ≤
CF (x) ≤ 0.1. Before reporting, we multiply the DtC scores
by 1000 to bring them between 1 and 100.
Measuring DtC for Baseline Models. Table 7 presents the
average DtC scores, C, of our baseline models. We define a
model’s DtC gap, CD−S , as its relative difference between
CD and CS . The larger DtC gaps indicate greater levels of
vulnerability and may enable an adversary to more accu-
rately differentiate between D and S.
First, we see that the average DtC scores are significantly
lower on S than on D; confirming our initial intuition. The
DtC gap also correlates well with the success of existing
MIAs. Further, as the task complexity goes up, the DtC
scores on S decrease, as a result of more severe overfit-
ting. These findings indicate that the DtC is a reasonable
metric for studying the vulnerability against MIAs.
Table 7: Average DtC scores of the baseline models on their
training set, S, and their test set,D. We also present the DtC
gap, CS−D, as a percentage.
TASK CD CS CD−S AdvY eom
F-MNIST 5.2 2.8 46.1% 9.6%
CIFAR-10 2.2 1.0 54.5% 35.8%
CIFAR-100 8.0 1.1 86.2% 68.9%
Measuring DtC for Regularized Models. Table 8 presents
the average DtC scores of the models with regularization, in
the RAD<15% scenario. First note that, even when it fully
eliminates the MIAs, random cropping on Fashion-MNIST
still displays a 5% DtC gap; indicating the vulnerability
might still persist. Even though it significantly reduces the
MIA success, models trained with distillation have usu-
ally large CD−S . For example, on CIFAR-10, distillation
achieves 5% AdvY eom and still displays 22% stability gap;
whereas weight decay achieves a smaller 20% gap with 7%
AdvY eom. Similarly, on CIFAR-100, distillation achieves
22% AdvY eom and 64% gap; again larger than 60% gap
spatial dropout achieves. This hints that distillation’s suc-
cess against MIAs might be giving a false sense of privacy
as the models’ DtC gap is larger than expected.
Further, we see that adding Gaussian noise also leads to
large DtC gaps, even though it prevents the MIAs. For ex-
ample, on Fashion-MNIST, it leads to a 12% gap, while
achieving only 1% AdvY eom. We hypothesize that adding
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noise does not prevent overfitting but it merely obfuscates
where the model’s confident regions are. This reduces the
success of the known MIAs; however, our DtC metric finds
the obfuscated regions and exposes the vulnerability.
For dropout, spatial dropout and random cropping, we ob-
serve that their success against MIAs aligns well with their
DtC gaps. This implies that these mechanisms are not mis-
leading and provide more reliable privacy.
Finally, we measure the DtC gap for the models that
combine multiple mechanisms in Section 5. On CIFAR-
100, combining cropping (c=16) with distillation (T=50)
achieves 5% AdvY eom; however, with 22% DtC gap. Sim-
ilarly, the combination of cropping and spatial dropout
(q=0.25) results in 3% AdvY eom with 9% DtC gap. Crop-
ping with early stopping (E=5) shrinks the DtC gap to
∼0% and achieves 2% AdvY eom; however, it also causes
46% accuracy drop. Overall, combining can improve the
resilience against known MIAs; however, it cannot prevent
the DtC gap and the give a false sense of privacy.
Table 8: Average DtC scores of the models with regular-
ization in the RAD<15% scenario. Each cell contains the
model’s CD, CS , CD−S and AdvY eom; in its top left, top
right, bottom left and bottom right quadrants, respectively.
R. F-MNIST CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100
T
20.4 19.0
6.9% 0.5%
4.5 3.5
22.2% 5.4%
6.7 2.4
64.2% 21.6%
α
56.9 56.4
0.9% 0.4%
4.3 2.7
37.2% 19.3%
13.3 1.9
85.7% 43.8%
σ
10.6 9.3
12.3% 1.2%
3.6 1.6
55.6% 19.7%
7.3 1.3
82.2% 57.4%
c
19.9 18.9
5.0% 0.0%
3.9 3.7
3.9% 2.2%
5.2 4.2
19.2% 9.0%
p
44.2 41.5
6.1% 1.4%
20.6 18.6
9.7% 13.1%
5.5 1.2
78.2% 57.1%
q
67.5 65.3
3.3% 1.0%
10.2 9.1
10.8% 2.8%
13.7 5.5
59.8% 32.4%
λ
54.2 53.8
1.1% 0.6%
4.5 3.6
20.0% 6.7%
8.0 1.1
86.2% 55.9%
E
37.3 34.9
6.4% 1.9%
6.4 5.4
15.6% 5.7%
7.8 2.3
70.5% 46.1%
Measuring DtC for Differentially-Private Models. Mod-
els trained with DP provide worst-case privacy guar-
antees, regardless of the attack. As a result, given
strong enough guarantees, we expect DP not to dis-
play any significant DtC gap. To confirm, we analyze
the models trained with increasing intensities of DP,
0.01≤σDP≤10; 3×105>ε>0.15, on Fashion-MNIST.
Figure 1 shows how the DtC gap and the success against
MIAs change, along with stronger DP guarantees. We
see that even when DP achieves AdvY eom ≈ 1% with
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Figure 1: Measuring the DtC gap for models trained with
different levels of differential privacy.
0.25≤σDP≤1; the large DtC Gap indicates the vulnera-
bility still persists. The privacy budgets in these settings,
2×102>ε>2, are usually considered to be insufficient.
On the other hand, for stronger privacy guarantees,
2.5≤σDP≤10; 2>ε>0.15, the DtC gap shrinks; even
though, AdvY eom still stays around ∼1%. This highlights
the utility of having stronger DP guarantees, even though
there is no practical attack that can achieve the worst-case.
We believe our DtC metric also provides practitioners a
more reliable way of adjusting DP’s privacy budget, as we
show that success against MIAs underestimates the vulner-
ability and DP’s guarantees might be too restrictive.
7 Conclusions
We conduct a systematical study on the effectiveness of
regularization in mitigating membership inference attacks
(MIAs) against deep learning models. We identify the ef-
fective, e.g., random cropping, and ineffective, e.g., weight
decay, mechanisms, which allows us to propose practi-
cal guidelines. Further, we reveal that the label smooth-
ing mechanism, by improving both the generalization and
the attack performance, challenges the notion that MIAs
stem from overfitting. Our findings on combining multiple
mechanisms highlight an important research direction of
finding optimal combinations to prevent MIAs. Finally, we
design a white-box metric to provide realistic lower bounds
for the vulnerability. Our metric helps us to show that, even
when existing MIAs fail, a model may still remain vulnera-
ble to unknown future attacks. This exposes the false sense
of privacy given by certain regularization mechanisms, e.g.,
distillation; and also illustrates the usefulness of differential
privacy that prior work considers as restrictive in practice.
We hope that our work acts as a bridge between the practi-
cal and formal solutions to the privacy leakage problem.
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